Personal Representative as a Party to Foreclosure Suit Against Real Property of an Estate by Young, Maurice A.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
CODE PLEADING
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AS A PARTY TO FORECLOSURE SUIT
AGAINST REAL PROPERTY OF AN ESTATE.
A practical problem in Ohio probate procedure is presented by the
question of whether the personal representative is a necessary party to a
foreclosure action brought by a mortgagee on real property belonging to
the estate. A usage prevalent in Ohio is to join the personal representa-
tive in all foreclosure actions and where there is no personal representa-
tive, to have one appointed in order to make him a party defendant.
It is generally held in the United States that a personal representative
is not a necessary party to an action to foreclose a mortgage on real
property belonging to the estate. On the other hand, he is a proper party
as the land of a decedent is an asset in the hands of his personal repre-
§entative for the payment of his debts, if needed for that purpose.
Trapier v. Waldo, 16 S.C. 276 (i88I); Worthington v. Lee, 2 Bland.
678 (Md. 1830); Henry v. McNew, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 288, 69 S.W.
213 (1902); Daniel v. Grahame, 2 Har. & G. (Md. 1827); Simon
v. Sabb. 56 S.C. 38, S.E. 799 (1899); Prager v. Wootton, 30 S.W.
(2nd) 845 (Ark. 1930); United Security Life Ins. & Trust Co. v.
Vandegrift's 4dm'r., 51 N.J.E. 400, 26 A. 985 (1893); Bliss Code
Pleading (3rd Ed.) Sec. 102; Story, Equity Pleading (Ioth Ed.)
Sec. 196.
A minority of the jurisdictions uphold the view that the personal
representative is not only a proper but a necessary party to an action to
foreclose a mortgage. In California the general code provides that the
heir shall be represented by the representative, but the other jurisdictions
support their conclusions by nothing other than the statement itself. Miles
v. Smith, 22 Mo. 502 (1856); Huston v. Stringham, 21 Ia. 36
(1866); but the decision of the case is weakened because it relies on
the authority of Darlington v. Effey, 13 Ia. 177 (1862), wherein the
court held that the representative was a proper rather than a necessary
party; Seal v. Chadwick, 45 A. 718 (Del. 19oo); McCaughey v.
Lyall, 152 Cal 61, 93 Pac. 681 (19o8).
The only authority available in Ohio is found in the decisions of
inferior courts and respectable authorities on Ohio probate procedure.
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These express the view that the personal representative is a necessary
party only where judgment is demanded against the estate though he is
a proper party in all cases. The earliest decision, that in Hall v. Musler,
i Disney 36 (Ohio, 12 Ohio Dec. 471 (855), while not stating that
proposition in so many words, seems to reach that conclusion. However,
the law so stated in McMahan v. Davis, 19 O.C.C. 242, io C.D. 467
(1899), and that case is approved in a dictum in Sherman v. Millard,
6 C.C. (N.S.) 338, 17 C.D. 175 (904). See also Phillips, Code
Pleading (ist Ed.) Sec. 5o8.
The minority American view purports to find its support in four
instances: i. Where the property is sold on foreclosure sale for more
than the mortgage debt. 2. Where a creditor files his claim within the
statutory period but after inception of the foreclosure action. 3- Where
the property is likely to be sacrificed on foreclosure sale. 4. Where a
money judgment is sought against the estate. After careful consideration
of the four situations, it is submitted that the only situation which supports
the minority view is that wherein a money judgment is sought against
the estate.
If the property is sold for more than the mortgage debt, the joining
of the personal representative to the foreclosure action offers no advan-
tages. In any case, the money is paid into the probate court pending
administration of the estate, and its disposition is handled through the
court. This procedure is followed regardless of the amount realized
through the sale.
When a creditor files his claim within the statutory period but after
inception of the foreclosure action, that information can be had from the
representative or the probate court whether or not the personal repre-
sentative is a party to the foreclosure action.
Where the property is likely to be sacrificed on foreclosure sale, the
only power devolving upon the personal representative is to buy the
property for the estate, and that power can be exercised by him whether
or not he is a party to the action.
However, in the case where a money judgment is sought against the
estate, the personal representative must be made a party to the action
in order to render a valid personal judgment against the estate. Further-
more, where the estate has assets that might be resorted to in the event
that the sale did not bring enough to cover the mortgage, it is advisable
to have a personal representative appointed and to join him as a party
defendant, and in the petition, pray for a deficiency judgment.
While in many cases the procedure may not be necessary, it is always
proper, and on the whole a desirable practice. Strictly speaking the neces-
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sity arises only where a money judgment is sought against the estate.
Where an estate has no assets of which a deficiency judgment could be
availed, a prayer for a money judgment should not be included in the
petition. But where the estate has assets that might be resorted to in the
event that the sale did not bring enough to cover the mortgage, it is
deemed advisable to pray for a deficiency judgment and have a personal
representative appointed and joined as a party to the foreclosure action.
MAURICE A. YOUNG.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
VALIDITY OF STATUTE ALLOWING MODIFICATION OF CRIMINAL
VERDICT BY APPELLATE COURT.
The defendant, Turk, procured others to fire a building so that he
might collect insurance. The fire spread to adjoining apartments, and
Miss Clara Withers was burned to death. Turk was indicted and con-
victed of murder in the first degree. Turk brought error to the Court
of Appeals of Cuyahoga County. Because there was no evidence of any
intent to kill, but merely evidence of homicide committed in perpetration
of arson, the Court of Appeals modified the verdict to "guilty of man-
slaughter." Turk v. State, 48 Ohio App. 489, 194 N.E. 425 (1935)-
Affirmed by divided court, 129 Ohio St. 245, 194 N.E. 453 (1935).
This action was taken under the authority of Section 13449-I para-
graph 4 of the Ohio General Code:
". . . if the evidence shows the defendant to be not guilty of the
degree of crime for which he is convicted, but guilty of a lesser de-
gree thereof, or of a lesser crime included therein, the court may
modify the verdict or finding accordingly without ordering a new
trial."
and of Article IV, Section 6 of the Ohio Constitution:
"The courts of appeal shall have . . appellate jurisdiction .
to modify, . . .the judgments of the courts . . .of record."
It will be noticed that the statute allows modification of the verdict,
while the constitutional provision authorizes only the modification of the
judgment.
The Ohio Constitution, Article I, Sections 5 and io, guarantees the
right of trial by jury. Is this right violated by the statute quoted above?
This question was not raised in the principal case, but the facts present it.
The Ohio statute was copied from Section 1181, paragraph 6 of
the California Penal Code (1927), but the Ohio statute was made to
